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In this study, we draw upon insights from agency theory to examine the impact of
managerial political ties on cost of debt and also to explore whether corporate governance
mediates this impact. We hypothesize that political ties reduce ﬁnancial reporting quality,
disclosure of non-ﬁnancial information and board independence, and are therefore asso-
ciated with higher interest rates. We also hypothesize that the negative effect of political
ties on the cost of debt will be stronger if ﬁrms borrow from privately-owned banks versus
government-owned banks. Using data from Ghana, we ﬁnd support for our direct and
moderation hypotheses; political ties are associated with high interest rates and poor
corporate governance. However, we do not ﬁnd evidence of mediation. Altogether, the
ﬁndings reveal the dark side of political connections and highlight the cost of political
embeddedness in emerging credit markets.
© 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Introduction
Political strategy researchers have explored the beneﬁts of political ties, deﬁned as the personal and social relationships
managers develop andmaintainwith politicians (Guo et al., 2014; Park and Luo, 2001). Indeed, over the last two decades there
has been a proliferation of literature focusing on value of political ties (see Mellahi et al., 2016; Rajwani and Liedong, 2015).
Particularly, there is increasing attention on the link between political ties and debt ﬁnancing. The small body of research
focusing on this topic unanimously shows that political ties enable ﬁrms to gain access to bank loans (e.g. Saeed et al., 2015;
Yeh et al., 2013). However, it is still not clear whether these ties enable ﬁrms to get loans at lower interest rates. Although
previous studies have examined the impact of political ties on the cost of debt (e.g. Bliss and Gul, 2012; Chen et al., 2014;
Houston et al., 2014), the ﬁndings are far from conclusive.
Additionally, literature on the impact of corporate political activity (CPA henceforth) on ﬁrm performance in general, and
on the cost of debt in particular, suffers from an under-examination of mediating mechanisms (see Guo et al., 2014; Mellahi
et al., 2016). At best, researchers conjecture mediation to explain their empirical ﬁndings. While conjecturing is a good step
towards theorization, the lack of empirical veriﬁcation curtails a deeper understanding of the means or intermediate out-
comes through which political ties are translated into value-adding or value-eroding outcomes (Rajwani and Liedong, 2015).
Related to the above, majority of political strategy studies focus on developed markets and a few emerging markets in Asia
(e.g. Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006). Thus, there have been calls to extend strategy research toedong), tazeeb.rajwani@essex.ac.uk (T. Rajwani).
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et al., 2016). In emerging and developing countries, especially in Africa, access to ﬁnance and cost of debt are major im-
pediments to ﬁrms (Aryeetey, 1998; Beck et al., 2006). Similarly, corporate governance is very poor in these countries (Young
et al., 2008). Could poor governance be a mechanism affecting debt ﬁnancing in emerging countries? This question is
important but has not been adequately addressed, especially in the African context. Moreover, the existing political ties
studies in emerging countries draw more on resource based view or dependency theory (Li and Zhang, 2007; Shirodkar and
Mohr, 2015), institutional theory (Nell et al., 2015; White et al., 2015) and social network theory (Acquaah, 2007; Peng and
Luo, 2000). Though these theories help to explain political activity in emerging countries, they neglect or are perhaps
inappropriate to investigate principal-agent relationships and governance dynamics in politically connected ﬁrms. Political
activity has governance implications which underpin ﬁrms' performance (Hadani and Schuler, 2013). In emerging countries
where institutional development is fragile (Acquaah, 2007; Xin and Pearce, 1996), these implications might even be more
serious and deserve adequate research attention. Therefore, agency theory is useful for explaining governance practices and
organizational behaviours (Eisenhardt, 1989) that mediate the link between political activity and ﬁrm-level contractual
outcomes.
In this study, we attempt to address the above research gaps using the agency perspective to examine the relationship and
mediating mechanisms between political ties and the cost of debt. We propose that the quality of corporate governance in
politically connected ﬁrms mediates the interest rates these ﬁrms are charged when they borrow from banks. Precisely, we
argue that politically connected ﬁrms have stronger motivations to misreport their ﬁnancial performance in order to conceal
any inappropriate economic appropriation (Guedhami et al., 2014). Thus, the quality of ﬁnancial reports produced by con-
nected ﬁrms is low (Chaney et al., 2011). Also, fraudulent practices in these ﬁrms are detected late and the penalties for
misbehaviour are usually lenient (Correia, 2014; Yu and Yu, 2011). We contend that leniency in dealing with connected ﬁrms
will particularly be common in emerging countries where the formal institutions for ensuring compliance areweak or fraught
with political interference. Therefore, banks will penalize connected ﬁrms with high interest rates to compensate for in-
formation asymmetry and risk.
Additionally, we argue that connected ﬁrms in emerging countries would want to reduce their visibility to institutional
stakeholders in order to avoid scrutiny, especially when their political ties become volatile (Decker, 2011). This implies that
the disclosure of non-ﬁnancial information in these ﬁrms will be low, a situation that has negative consequences for loan
ﬁnancing. Further, the strongmotivation to avoid scrutiny will cause politically connected ﬁrms to have fewer independent or
external directors. The resultant weakmonitoring and lack of external oversightwill reduce creditworthiness and lead to high
interest rates (e.g. Anderson et al., 2004; Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003).
Our study contributes to CPA literature in several ways. First, it adds to the growing strategy research on the performance
outcomes of political strategies and sheds more light on the implications of political ties in credit markets. It is worth noting
that the effect of political ties on cost of debt has not received adequate attention, despite the importance of loan ﬁnance for
ﬁrms in emerging markets (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006). Findings from the few studies that have examined this topic are
mixed and inconclusive. For example, on one hand, political ties inﬂuence proﬁtability, enhance the creditworthiness of ﬁrms
and culminates in low loan rates (Houston et al., 2014). On the other hand, political ties may cause poor corporate governance,
reduce ﬁrm performance, increase information asymmetry and result in high loan rates (Bliss and Gul, 2012). Our study joins
this debate and attempts to clarify the impact of political ties in credit markets. Additionally, our study demonstrates how
bank ownership moderates the relationship between political ties and interest rates. The ﬁndings suggest that due to the
principal-agency relationship existing between politicians (principals) and government-owned banks (agents), these banks
tend to overlook the agency problems inherent in connected ﬁrms. Essentially, government-owned banks are policy tools
used by politicians to redistribute or allocate resources (Sapienza, 2004).
Second, this study offers a cautionary insight into the negative effect of political activity on corporate governance. In other
words, it addresses the inﬂuence of political connections on corporate governance and ﬁnancial behaviour (Chaney et al.,
2011), and shows that there is a dark side to corporate political embeddedness (Okhmatovskiy, 2010). This contribution is
very important because even though the dark side of political activity has been documented (Doh et al., 2012; Sun et al., 2016),
there is still a paucity of empirical research on what the speciﬁc dark elements are, particularly with respect to corporate
transparency and monitoring (Okhmatovskiy, 2010).
Finally, this study attempts to enhance our understanding of how political ties affect cost of debt. As noted previously, one
of the notable shortcomings in CPA literature is the limited treatise of mediatingmechanisms (Guo et al., 2014). By empirically
examining the mediating role of agency in the political ties-cost of debt relationship, this study transcends a conjecture of
mediation as is commonly done in existing ﬁnance and management research. Our ﬁndings show that even though political
ties lead to poor governance, poor governance does not seem to mediate the impact of political ties on the cost of debt. This
suggests that the size of protection or the value of insurance connected ﬁrms gain from politicians (e.g. Li and Zhang, 2007;
Luo and Zhao, 2013; Xin and Pearce, 1996) causes banks to overlook the inherent information opaqueness in these ﬁrms. In
sum, this study suggests that in emerging countries, connected ﬁrms' poor governance is reinforced by the unwillingness of
politicians and government agencies to enforce compliance and also by the failure of business entities such as banks to
penalize them (through loan rates) for their illegal and unethical behaviour.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next sections, we review related literature and theory before developing
the hypotheses. We then describe the methodology, present the results and discuss the contributions of the study. We
conclude with a note on limitations and suggestions for future research.
T.A. Liedong, T. Rajwani / Long Range Planning 51 (2018) 666e679668Theoretical background and hypotheses
Research on the impact of political ties in debt ﬁnancing has yielded controversial ﬁndings. For instance, Leuz and
Oberholzer-Gee (2006) found that local political patronage offsets the beneﬁts of global ﬁnancing and enables connected
ﬁrms in Indonesia to access ﬁnancing at lower costs. This ﬁnding is corroborated by Claessens et al. (2008) in Brazil, Chen et al.
(2014) in Taiwan, Khwaja and Mian (2005) in Pakistan and Houston et al. (2014) in the U.S. Other studies, however, show that
the effect of political ties in credit markets is negative. For instance, Bliss and Gul (2012) found that connected ﬁrms are
charged high interest rates in Malaysia.
Some of the studies above have attempted to theoretically explain the mechanisms underlying the impact of political ties
on debt ﬁnancing (e.g. Bliss and Gul, 2012; Houston et al., 2014; Yeh et al., 2013). First, they argue that government ownership
of banks creates an implicit requirement for loan ofﬁcers and bank executives to honour the preferences of politicians (Yeh
et al., 2013). Therefore, government-owned banks are captives of government ofﬁcials. Acts of insubordination can be
penalized with dismissal or demotion (Khwaja and Mian, 2005). Consequently, politically connected ﬁrms are treated
favourably by these banks (Chen et al., 2014). Second, they highlight that weak institutions and high levels of corruptionmake
it possible for politicians to inﬂuence lending decisions (Barth et al., 2009) and discriminate in favour of politically connected
ﬁrms (Brandt and Li, 2003). Third, they suggest that banks will give preferential treatment to connected ﬁrms in order to gain
an indirect access to the corridors of political and regulatory power (Houston et al., 2014). Having access to politicians,
through cordial lending relationships with connected ﬁrms, could avail some economic beneﬁts to the banks, such as winning
government underwriting business (Butler et al., 2009) and contracts (Witko, 2011) or even participating in government
foreign trade missions (Schuler et al., 2002). Fourth, they note that increased riskiness in politically connected ﬁrms leads to
high interest rates (Bliss and Gul, 2012). The main thrust of this argument resonates with the fact that connected ﬁrms are
highly leveraged (Fraser et al., 2006) and have a higher propensity to record negative equity (Bliss and Gul, 2012). Essentially,
the riskiness argument is consistent with the agency and corporate governance concerns that are commonly anticipated or
observed in connected ﬁrms (Gul, 2006).
Considering the paucity of empirical research on the mediating mechanisms of political connections (Guo et al., 2014;
Rajwani and Liedong, 2015), and the enormous negativity about corporate governance in politically connected ﬁrms
(Guedhami et al., 2014), especially in emerging countries where the dark side of CPA (Doh et al., 2012) is more likely to
manifest through corruption (Lawton et al., 2013a) and rent appropriation (Sun et al., 2016), there is the need for research to
empirically explore how the quality of corporate governance mediates the impact of political ties in credit markets. The need
for this line of enquiry is even greater in empirically under-researched contexts such as Ghana where State institutions are
weak, interest rates are very high, and corporate governance is poor (Aboagye et al., 2008; Mensah and Abor, 2014; Tsamenyi
et al., 2007).
CPA research in emerging countries has mainly drawn upon resource-based and institutional theories. These theories
support the unanimity that political ties help ﬁrms to secure more bank loans (e.g. Fraser et al., 2006; Johnson and Mitton,
2003; Khwaja and Mian, 2005). For instance, since political ties serve as substitutes for weak market supporting institutions
in emerging countries (Xin and Pearce, 1996), institutional theory mainly portrays political ties as positive and necessary.
Similarly, resource based view theory portrays political ties and political capabilities as crucial sources of competitive
advantage (Lawton et al., 2013b).
However, because political ties can add or destroy value (Rajwani and Liedong, 2015), institutional and resource-based
logics have limited ability to explain the negative outcomes of political activity. Political connections can help to align gov-
ernment policy with the preferences of interest groups, but they can also lead to agency problems (Sun et al., 2016) and poor
ﬁrm performance (Hadani and Schuler, 2013). In credit markets, political ties could lead to high interest rates due to high
leverage and compromised management in connected ﬁrms (Bliss and Gul, 2012). More importantly, implicit guarantees of
protection from politicians (see Faccio et al., 2006) could lead to a moral hazard problem in connected ﬁrms. Therefore,
agency theory is appropriate for investigating the mechanics of contractual outcomes because of its suitability for studying
negative behaviours such as deception and secrecy (Eisenhardt, 1989), which could be politically-motivated.
Agency theory is particularly important for strategy research in emerging countries (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Wright et al.,
2005) where uncertain environments and a general lack of managerial skills can lead to strategic decisions that may be
inconsistent with widely acceptable governance practices. Formal institutions such as regulations regarding ﬁnancial
reporting and disclosure are either not existent or not effectively enforced (Young et al., 2008). In other words, there is little
institutional support for standard corporate governance practices in emerging countries (Peng, 2004). In these countries, the
rule of law is prone to political interference (Sun et al., 2016), implying that disciplinary actions against politically connected
ﬁrms could be difﬁcult to enforce. This makes governance an important yardstick for assessing creditworthiness (Bliss and
Gul, 2012; Holder-Webb and Sharma, 2010).
Political ties and cost of debt
Research has shown that the impact of political connections on cost of debt varies with the level institutional develop-
ment. These connections are more valuable in developed countries compared to emerging credit markets. For example,
Infante and Piazza (2014) found that politically connected ﬁrms in Italy borrow at low interest rates. Similarly, Houston et al.
(2014) who studied the political ties of S&P 500 companies in the U.S found that ﬁrms with politicians on their boards are
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by approximately 13e20 basis points, mainly as bankers recognize the positive inﬂuence political connections have on
proﬁtability, information access and policy risk reduction (e.g. Bradley et al., 2016; Goldman et al., 2009; Hillman et al., 1999;
Hillman, 2005).
In emerging countries also, political connections are associated with proﬁtability (Acquaah, 2007; Peng and Luo, 2000).
Connections enable ﬁrms to overcome bureaucracy (Luo, 2001), exploit their policy environments and obtain key resources
which help them to develop competitive capabilities (Xin and Pearce, 1996) and recognize entrepreneurial opportunities
(Guo et al., 2014). Moreover, these connections allow ﬁrms to inﬂuence resource allocation and gain institutional support (Li
and Zhou, 2010). Essentially, the prevalence of weakmarket supporting institutions in emerging countries suggests that social
relationships, including political ties, are important for economic exchange (Peng and Luo, 2000; Sheng et al., 2011).
Despite the advantage of political ties in emerging countries, banks may still perceive connected ﬁrms to be risky. As noted
by Park and Luo (2001), cultivating and sustaining political ties can be costly, particularly when ﬁrms have to reciprocate by
supporting government's social and economic goals (Luo, 2001, 2004) or by giving gifts to politicians (Peng and Luo, 2000).
Political ties can also stiﬂe organizational agility in dynamic environments (Sun et al., 2010) and cause ﬁrms to diverge from
shareholders' interests (Okhmatovskiy, 2010) through the “grabbing hand” of politicians (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). More-
over, the absence of effective institutional checks and balances in emerging countries affords connected ﬁrms the opportunity
to default on loans and indulge in morally hazardous behaviour because they are protected by politicians.
Consequently, banks are conservative or negative about the creditworthiness of connected ﬁrms. For example, Bliss and
Gul (2012) found that due to their high inherent risk (Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Gul, 2006), connected ﬁrms are charged
high interest rates in Malaysia. Generally in emerging countries, corporate governance is poor (Young et al., 2008) and the
dark side of political connections is more likely to manifest through agency problems and corruption (Efﬁezal et al., 2011;
Lawton et al., 2013a; Sun et al., 2016). Therefore, we propose that banks will charge high interest rates to compensate for
the high agency costs in connected ﬁrms.
H1. Managerial political ties are positively related to the cost of debt in emerging countries.Moderation of bank ownership
The important role of government-owned banks in giving preferential treatment to politically connected ﬁrms has been
documented in the literature (e.g. Chen et al., 2014). In most countries, governments own or have controlling stakes in banks
(La Porta et al., 2002), and in these banks, it is politicians who determine the constitution of the Boards and top management
teams. As a result, bank executives (i.e. agents) are expected to perform their duties in accordance with the preferences of
politicians (i.e. principals), which makes them less sensitive to the riskiness of connected ﬁrms. Managers could be trans-
ferred, demoted or removed if they do not comply with political directives (Khwaja and Mian, 2005). Therefore, government-
owned banks are vessels used by politicians to achieve personal ends (Onder and Ozyildirim, 2011). For instance, in election
years, these banks increase their lending relative to private banks (Dinc, 2005), with most of the loans going to ﬁrms located
in the areas where the incumbent political party has strong support (Sapienza, 2004).
Privately-owned banks, however, are not expected to give undue preferential treatment to politically connected ﬁrms. In
principle, the principal-agent relationship existing between politicians and government-owned banks is not the same for
privately-owned banks. As their management is expected to be independent of political interference, privately-owned banks
are less likely to pursue politically-motivated lending. In fact, because of the costs of political embeddedness (Okhmatovskiy,
2010; Siegel, 2007; Sun et al., 2012), privately-owned banks might penalize politically connected ﬁrms with high interest
rates. In emerging countries such as Ghana, privately-owned banks lack adequate political support to pursue or take recovery
actions against defaulting connected ﬁrms. Hence, they are likely to charge high interest rates for the high risk. We therefore
hypothesize the following:
H2a. The positive relationship between political ties and the cost of debt is weakenedwhen ﬁrms borrow from government-
owned banks.
H2b. The positive relationship between political ties and the cost of debt is strengthened when ﬁrms borrow from privately-
owned banks.The mediating role of ﬁnancial reporting quality
Political ties can lead to high interest rates by promoting and supporting poor ﬁnancial reporting cultures in ﬁrms. In fact,
prior studies have considered low quality ﬁnancial information as an outcome associated with political connections (Chaney
et al., 2011), mainly as connected ﬁrms may report little information to cover up operational inefﬁciencies or appropriation
activities that stem from political cronyism (Guedhami et al., 2014; Gul, 2006). Politicians could also use overinﬂated or
ﬁctitious contracts to channel corruption proceeds into the accounts of connected ﬁrms. As these ﬁrms “derive gains from
their connections over and above the payments they make” (Wang et al., 2017: 146), they will be less inclined to accurately
report their earnings. Moreover, ﬁrms rarely report political spending in their ﬁnancial statements (Aggarwal et al., 2012;
T.A. Liedong, T. Rajwani / Long Range Planning 51 (2018) 666e679670Hadani and Schuler, 2013), which gives managers an incentive to conceal or distort ﬁnancial information in order to avoid
outsider or shareholder interference (Leuz et al., 2003).
Additionally, political ties enable ﬁrms to avoid the discipline of corporate governance rules and regulations (Luo, 2001;
Sun et al., 2016). Connected ﬁrms are known to report low quality ﬁnancial information (Chaney et al., 2011). They may also
indulge in fraudulent behaviours which are usually detected late (Yu and Yu, 2011). As most courts in emerging countries are
rarely independent of political interference, fraudulent connected ﬁrms are less likely to be penalized. They also have higher
chances of favourable appeals against court decisions (Firth et al., 2011). Even in advanced countries, connected ﬁrms face
lower penalties when they are prosecuted (Correia, 2014). These ﬁndings suggest that connected ﬁrms are protected by
politicians (Chaney et al., 2011), which creates a moral hazard problemwhereby these ﬁrms are careless about their ﬁnancial
behaviour. In Ghana and other African countries where corporate governance is still developing (Abor and Fiador, 2013) and
political systems are still consolidating (Luiz and Stewart, 2014), there is sufﬁcient expectation that political ties will lead to
poor ﬁnancial reporting quality.
Moreover, there are costs associated with political ties (Park and Luo, 2001; Peng and Luo, 2000). For instance, politically
connected ﬁrms may be required by politicians to fund public and social programs (Luo, 2001, 2004) or even contribute to
political campaigns. Managers may exclude these expenditures from their ﬁnancial reports, which creates agency problems
and conceals the true state of the ﬁrms' ﬁnancial health. Poor ﬁnancial reporting can affect the ability to raise loan capital
(Chen et al., 2011). Firms with poor accounting information have high agency and information risk (Lin et al., 2014), and are
either denied credit, charged high interest rates or made to pledge huge collateral (Bharath et al., 2008). Therefore, we
propose that:
H3. Financial reporting quality mediates the positive relationship between political ties and cost of debt in emerging
countries.The mediating role of non-ﬁnancial disclosure
In the context of emerging countries, we assert that political ties do not promote the disclosure of non-ﬁnancial infor-
mation. Insights from the literature suggest that politically connected ﬁrms are likely to be invisible or less transparent,
especially when they enjoy substantial beneﬁts of dubious legality (Chaney et al., 2011; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006). Non-
ﬁnancial reports will increase their visibility, and could cause shareholders and other institutional actors to question not only
the issues captured in the disclosures but also to peruse their ﬁnancial reports. In effect, politically connected ﬁrms might
view non-mandatory disclosures as unwanted audit invitations to outsiders. Therefore, political ties will lead to an opaque
disclosure culture, mainly to conceal from external stakeholders any questionable future revenue streams such as sole-
sourced government contracts, illegal licenses, cheap privatized acquisitions or even liabilities arising from political risks.
The resultant information asymmetry will adversely affect loan pricing. Banks and other investors usually look up
corporate information prior to making loan decisions (Bharath et al., 2008). In very risky environments such as Ghana, past
ﬁnancial informationmay not be informative of future cash ﬂows, thus banks use non-ﬁnancial and governance disclosures to
support decision making (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003). We propose that political connected ﬁrms discourage these explicit
disclosures in order to reduce their visibility, which subsequently leads to high loan rates. We propose that:
H4. Non-ﬁnancial disclosuremediates the positive relationship between political ties and cost of debt in emerging countries.The mediating role of board independence
Politically connected managers and CEOs will have little incentive to ensure that their actions and those of their ﬁrms are
monitored by external and professional board members, mainly as effective monitoring could obstruct politically-motivated
appropriation or spending. At best, connected ﬁrms may prefer to appoint internal directors who will serve as allies to
politically connected CEOs and help protect political interests, rather than shareholders' interests (Yeh et al., 2013). These
internal (executive) directors are likely to overlook executives' behaviour, which will culminate in unchecked CEO power. In
this respect, political ties will cause low board independence in ﬁrms.
Finance and management research shows that board independence is associated with low spreads and bond yields
(Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Lin et al., 2014), mainly as non-executive directors can make more efﬁcient corporate decisions
(Rosenstein andWyatt, 1990), control CEO compensation (Boyd, 1994), easily ﬁre an under-performing CEO (Weisback, 1988)
and reduce corporate risk-taking (Bargeron et al., 2010). Also, the likelihood of ﬁnancial statement fraud is lower when there
are non-executive directors on corporate boards (Beasley, 1996). Their presence leads to stricter monitoring and lower cost of
debt (Francis et al., 2012). In emerging countries, evidence shows that board independence reduces agency costs (Rashid,
2015) and inﬂuences access to ﬁnance (Abor, 2007). This is because lenders use board independence as a measure of
borrower reliability (Holder-Webb and Sharma, 2010). We propose that the lack of board independence in politically con-
nected ﬁrms leads to high interest rates.
H5. Board independence mediates the positive relationship between political ties and cost of debt in emerging countries.
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Context & motivation
Investigating the mediating mechanisms of debt ﬁnancing in Ghana is important for several reasons. First, access to
ﬁnance is a major hindrance to private sector development in emerging countries (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006). In Ghana
particularly, credit is rationed (Robson et al., 2013) and ﬁrms are charged high interest rates. By focusing on the cost of debt,
we explore a phenomenon which has real signiﬁcance for ﬁrms operating in a bank-based economic system. Second, Ghana
has one of the highest interest rate regimes in the world (Aboagye et al., 2008). According to data from the central bank,
Ghana's monetary policy and interbank lending rates stood at 26% and 25.29% respectively as of December 2015, which are
very high even within the Africa region. Third, corporate governance in Ghana is poor (Tsamenyi et al., 2007), and this
phenomenon is expected to affect the pricing of loans. Processes to ensure accountability and ﬁnancial prudence are not
effectively implemented (Agyeman et al., 2013; Bokpin, 2009). Moreover, the criteria for appointing board members and
evaluating board performance are not institutionalized or well-deﬁned (Simpson, 2014). Fourth, Ghana has weak market
supporting institutions, which create an imperative for ﬁrms to develop and use networking relationships in economic
transactions (Acquaah, 2007). Political ties are therefore prevalent in the country, but they are rarely studied. For the above
reasons, Ghana provides a suitable context for examining not only the effect of political ties on cost of debt but also the
mediating role of corporate governance.
Sample and data collection
Most of the ﬁrms in Ghana are privately owned. Consequently, it is difﬁcult to obtain archival data, especially ﬁnancial
information (Acquaah, 2007; Amoako-Gyampah and Boye, 2001). Therefore, we used a survey which we designed and pilot
tested in three stages with 20 managers in Ghana to examine the validity of the questions (Mesquita and Lazzarini, 2008). All
themeasures in the questionnairewere developed from theory. Important issues and general rules of thumb about ambiguous
questioning, technical jargons, questionnaire layout, and length were all taken into consideration during the survey design.
Due to the lack of secondary data for management research in Ghana, most researchers use surveys. Consequently, ﬁrms
are usually ladened and inundated with many questionnaires, resulting in respondent fatigue and nonchalance. We therefore
found it imperative to distinguish our survey. We obtained endorsements from the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre
(GIPC), the Association of Ghana Industries (AGI) and the Ghana Association of Bankers (GAB). These endorsees play
important roles in promoting the private sector in Ghana, and were thus chosen to enhance the credibility of our study. For
example, AGI is a business group made up of over 1200 small, medium and large scale manufacturing ﬁrms in Ghana.
The data for this study was collected from senior managers such as Chief Executive Ofﬁcers (CEOs), Managing Directors
(MDs) and their deputies. Following prior studies (Robson et al., 2013), we developed a sample of 300 ﬁrms from multiple
sources such as the membership directory of AGI, Ghana Business Directory and Ghana Club 100. Questions in the survey
made reference to the past three years as the time frame for responses (i.e. 2011, 2012, and 2013); hence all the sampled ﬁrms
had operated in Ghana for at least three years prior to 2014. Due to poor postal services and lack of awell-functioning address
system in Ghana, the questionnaires were delivered on-site. We collected 179 surveys from ﬁrms operating in 21 industries,
resulting in a ﬁnal response rate of 59.6%.
Validity and reliability
Common Method Variance (CMV) is an important concern in survey research (Chang et al., 2010). We therefore used
various techniques to addressed CMV. First, we created cognitive speed bumps by reverse-phrasing some of the questions in
order to reduce acquiescence bias (Hinkin, 1995; Winkler et al., 1982). We did this because we suspected a high rate of
acquiescence bias in Ghana due to the increased use of questionnaires and the associated respondent fatigue. Second, we
addressed single rater bias by delivering two surveys, to be independently completed by two different managers, to each
sampled ﬁrm (Podsakoff et al., 2003). The handful of ﬁrms that returned both questionnaires showed a high level of internal
agreement, suggesting that the data from the remaining single respondents is reliable (Bjornali et al., 2016; Miller et al., 1997).
Additionally, we triangulated some of the survey data using information fromwebsites and annual reports, especially for the
few publicly listed ﬁrms in the sample. Third, we avoided potential CMV bymeasuring the dependent and predictor variables
using different types of data (Chang et al., 2010). Speciﬁcally, wemeasured cost of debt as a rate (%) andmeasured political ties
using a scale. Fourth, the questions in the survey were strategically ordered to reduce the likelihood of CMV across the in-
dependent, dependent and control variables (Barden et al., 2005). By ensuring that questions about the dependent and in-
dependent variables did not follow sequentially, wemade it difﬁcult for respondents to create variable correlations that could
bias their responses (Chang et al., 2010; Wiklund and Shepherd, 2005). Finally, we ruled out the existence of systemic non-
response bias by using the approach of Armstrong and Overton (1977) to compare early and late-arriving completed surveys.
Tests revealed no signiﬁcant difference for any key items or variables.
We conducted exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to identify the factor structure of the constructs. The EFA yielded four
factors (the ﬁrst factor accounted for 28.79% of the total variance), therefore suggesting the absence of a single factor in the
data (Harman, 1967). We further checked the unidimensionality of the constructs by conducting conﬁrmatory factor analysis
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factormodel (CFI¼ 0.68; NFI¼ 0.65, RMSEA¼ 0.42; p< 0.01). Themeasurement items, their respective loadings and T-values,
average variance extracted (AVE) and composite reliability (CR) are shown in Table 1. The AVE and CR scores exceed the
minimum thresholds of 0.50 and 0.70 respectively (Fornell and Larcker, 1981; Hair et al., 1998), thus conﬁrming reliability of
the constructs.Table 1
Constructs, measurement items and reliability.
Construct Measurement items Load T-value
Managerial political ties
(AVE ¼ 0.84; CR ¼ 0.94) Spending time dealing with gov't affairs 0.93 19.91
Investing in building relationships with gov't ofﬁcials 0.91 (Fixed)
Maintaining good relationships with gov't ofﬁcials 0.91 18.99
Institutional holding
(AVE ¼ 0.75; CR ¼ 0.95) Shares held by Pension funds 0.94 (Fixed)
Shares held by Insurance companies 0.92 22.73
Shares held by Endowment funds 0.88 20.09
Shares held by Mutual funds 0.86 18.76
Shares held by Charities 0.81 15.93
Shares held by Private equity ﬁrms 0.77 14.44
Financial reporting quality
(AVE ¼ 0.73; CR ¼ 0.91) Financial reporting done timely 0.89 12.97
Revenues deferred until veriﬁed 0.88 12.69
Expenses and losses recognised immediately 0.86 12.4
Financial reports meet acceptable standards 0.77 (Fixed)
Non-ﬁnancial disclosure
(AVE ¼ 0.60; CR ¼ 0.86) Disclosure of conﬂicts of interest 0.81 10.64
Disclosure of related party transactions 0.78 (Fixed)
Disclosure of anti-corruption policy 0.78 10.32
Disclosure of external and business risk assessments 0.72 9.51Furthermore, the Cronbach alphas for the constructs are well above the minimum threshold of 0.70 (Nunnally, 1978),
and thus support internal consistency and reliability. We followed the approach of Ambos et al. (2010) and checked
discriminant validity by comparing the square root of the average variance extracted (AVE) of each variable with the
correlation vbetween pairs of variables. The AVE values are consistently larger than the correlations between the variables,
indicating that each construct has more internally extracted variance than the variance it shares with other constructs
(Fornell and Larcker, 1981).Variables and measures
Independent variable
Without an objective measure of managerial political ties (a ¼ 0.94), we followed Li and Zhang (2007), Li and Atuahene-
Gima (2001) and Guo et al. (2014) and asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement with (a) investing in building
ties with government ofﬁcials (b) spending time dealing with government ofﬁcials and (c) making efforts to ensure good
relations with government ofﬁcials. These were measured on a scale ranging from (1) “strongly disagree” to (7) “strongly
agree”.
Dependent variable
Following Dygryse and Van Cayseele (2000), Bliss and Gul (2012), we measured cost of debt as the interest rates on loans.
We asked respondents to state their ﬁrms' three-year average interest rate on funds they borrowed from banks operating in
Ghana. Any loans from banks outside of Ghana were excluded. Considering how interest rate regimes differ across the world,
excluding foreign borrowing allowed for a robust and fair comparison across the ﬁrms.
Mediators/moderators
There is no consensual deﬁnition of reporting quality (Chen et al., 2011). Prior studies have measured ﬁnancial reporting
quality (a ¼ 0.91) using accounting data, speciﬁcally accruals quality (Garrett et al., 2014; Filip et al., 2015), but due the lack of
accounting data, wemeasured this variable using a scale. Deﬁning reporting quality as “the usefulness of ﬁnancial statements
to investors, creditors, managers, and all other parties contracting with the ﬁrm” (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005, p.84), we asked
ﬁrms to indicate their level of agreement with four statements, on a scale ranging from (1) “strongly disagree” to (7) “strongly
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(a ¼ 0.86). Guided by EU Non-ﬁnancial reporting guidelines, we developed a measure for this variable. Respondents were
asked to indicate the extent to which they agree that their ﬁrms voluntarily disclose information on related party trans-
actions, conﬂicts of interests, external risk assessments, anticorruption and bribery. The items were measured using a scale
ranging from (1) “strongly disagree” to (7) “strongly agree”. Following previous studies (e.g. Abor and Biekpe, 2007), we
operationalized board independence as the ratio of independent/non-executive directors to total number of board members.
We measured government-owned bank borrowing using a dummy coded 1 for ﬁrms that borrowed, in full or part, from the
three State bank banks in Ghana and 0 for ﬁrms that borrowed exclusively from privately-held banks.
Control variables
Institutional holding (a ¼ 0.94) can give credibility to ﬁrms and help lower interest rates. Due to the absence of objective
data which other studies used to measure institutional ownership (e.g. Hoskisson et al., 2002), we measured this variable by
asking respondents to indicate the extent to which Pension Funds, Mutual Funds, Insurance companies, Charities, and Private
Equity Firms hold shares in their companies on a Likert scale ranging from (1) “very low” to (7) “very high”. Firms that borrow
from multiple banks may beneﬁt low interest rates since competition between the banks may reduce rent extraction and
prevent a single bank from charging above-market rates (Dygryse and Van Cayseele, 2000). Conversely, multiple borrowing
relationships may signal low borrower quality (Bris andWelch, 2005) and can lead to high interest rates. We measured credit
relationships by asking respondents to state the number of banks in Ghana fromwhich their ﬁrms have borrowed funds. We
measured Collateral value by asking respondents to indicate the perceived value of collateral, in relation to total assets, their
ﬁrms pledged for loans on a scale from (1) “very low” to (7) “very high”. Ownershipwas deﬁned by a dummy variable, coded 1
for foreign ﬁrms (more than 50% of the ﬁrm owned by a foreigner) and 0 for local ﬁrms (50% or more of the ﬁrm owned by a
local investor). Following previous studies (Acquaah, 2007), Firm agewas operationalized as the number of years the ﬁrm has
been operational in Ghanawhile ﬁrm sizewas operationalized as the logarithm of the number of employees (after conducting
normality tests).
Analysis and results
The means, standard deviations, and correlation coefﬁcients are shown in Table 2. The correlation matrix reveals signif-
icant correlations between the variables. Variance Inﬂation Factor (VIF) scores are less than 2, and hence support the absence
of multicollinearity (Myers, 1990). Table 3 shows results for the direct andmoderated effect of political ties on the cost of debt.
In Model 1 where the controls are regressed on the dependent variable, institutional holding (b ¼ 0.005, p < 0.01) and
foreign ownership (b ¼ 0.018, p < 0.01) are negatively associated with interest rates, while collateral (b ¼ 0.004, p < 0.05)
and credit relationships (b ¼ 0.010, p < 0.01) are positively related to interest rates. In Model 3, political ties are signiﬁcantly
and positively related to interest rates (b ¼ 0.007, p < 0.01). This ﬁnding supports support H1, and is consistent with Bliss and
Gul (2012) who reported a positive association between political connections and cost of debt in Malaysia.Table 2
Correlations and descriptive statistics.
Mean SD Cronbach
alpha
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Largest
VIF
1 Managerial political
ties
3.90 2.19 0.94 1 1.09
2 Financial reporting
quality
5.83 1.19 0.91 0.15** 1 1.06
3 Non-ﬁnancial
disclosure
2.00 0.74 0.86 0.50*** 0.24*** 1 1.42
4 Board independence 0.15 0.13 e 0.18** 0.04 0.09 1 1.14
5 Institutional holding 2.08 1.51 0.94 0.06 0.10 0.04 0.28*** 1 1.1
6 Firm age 19.17 12.62 e 0.22*** 0.03 0.10 0.05 0.03 1 1.13
7 Firm size 4.56 0.62 e 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.13* 0.03 0.14* 1 1.05
8 Ownership 0.45 0.50 e 0.05 0.00 0.09 0.06 0.13* 0.12 0.11 1 1.15
9 Value of collateral 4.91 1.71 e 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.30** 1 1.07
10 Credit relationships 3.82 1.57 e 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.12 0.28*** 0.16** 0.09 0.13* 0.06 1 1.18
11 Interest rate 0.24 0.04 e 0.45*** 0.27*** 0.32*** 0.08 0.30*** 0.02 0.00 0.33*** 0.22*** 0.42*** 1 e
Note: N¼ 179; ***Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 1% level (2-tailed); **Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 5% level (2-tailed); *Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 10%
level (2-tailed).InModel 5, the interaction between political ties and borrowing from government-owned banks is signiﬁcant (b¼0.006,
p < 0.01). This result indicates that there is a signiﬁcant difference in the effect of political ties when ﬁrms borrow from
government-owned banks versus from privately-owned banks. Following the guidelines for the interpretation of interaction
Table 3
Direct and moderated effects of political ties on cost of debt.
Variables Interest rate
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4a Model 5b
Control variables
Institutional holding 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006***
Firm age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Firm size 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
Ownership 0.018*** 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.002
Value of collateral 0.004** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
Credit relationships 0.010*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005***
Moderator variable
Government-owned bank (GOB) 0.040*** 0.034*** 0.037*** 0.037***
Predictor variable
Managerial political ties (MPT) 0.007*** 0.003 0.009***
Interactionsc
MPTxPOB 0.006***
MPTxGOB 0.006***
Adjusted R2 0.26 0.44 0.56 0.58 0.58
Model F 11.04*** 19.98*** 27.94*** 26.74*** 26.74***
Note: N ¼ 179. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1 (two-tailed signiﬁcance tests).
a In Model 4, GOB was reverse-coded before creating interaction term MPTxPOB.
b Consistent with reverse coding, Model 5 is similar to Model 4, with the exception of the Constant, Interaction and MPT.
c Before creating the interactions terms, MPT was mean centred.
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terest rates when GOB ¼ 0 (i.e. borrowing from private-owned banks). This result is signiﬁcant (Model 5: b ¼ 0.009, p < 0.01)
and shows that politically connected ﬁrms are charged high rates when they borrow from private-owned banks, hence
providing support for hypothesis 2b. To estimate the moderating effect of borrowing from government-owned banks, we
followed the approach of Hadani and Schuler (2013) and reverse-recoded our dummy variable government-owned bank so
that borrowing from government banks ¼ 0 while borrowing from private-owned banks ¼ 1. The interaction between po-
litical ties and borrowing from privately-owned banks (POB) is signiﬁcant (Model 4: b¼ 0.006, p < 0.05) but the coefﬁcient for
MPT, which represents the effect of political ties when POB ¼ 0 (i.e. borrowing from government-owned banks), is insig-
niﬁcant (b ¼ 0.003, p > 0.1). This result provides partial support for hypothesis 2a, in the sense that the previously positive
association between political ties and the cost of debt (Model 3: b ¼ 0.007, p < 0.01) becomes insigniﬁcant when connected
ﬁrms borrow from government-owned banks. Fig. 1 shows the plot of the moderation effects.Fig. 1. The moderation effect of bank ownership.
1 When a model contains an interaction term which is the product of a continuous variable and a dummy variable, coefﬁcients on the lower-order
continuous term are interpreted as the effect of the continuous variable only and only when the dummy variable is 0. In effect, the result corresponds
with the group ¼ 0.
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show that the relationships between political ties and each of the mediator variables are signiﬁcant (Models 2 to 4). Precisely,
the results reveal that political ties are negatively related to ﬁnancial reporting quality (Model 2: b ¼ 0.096, p < 0.05), non-
ﬁnancial disclosure (Model 3: b ¼ 0.169, p < 0.01), and board monitoring (Model 4: b ¼ 0.009, p < 0.05), suggesting poor
governance in connected ﬁrms, as predicted.
As the mediator variables are signiﬁcantly related to the independent variable, they are included in the next stages where
their association with interest rates is tested together with the independent variable. The results for these next stages are
shown in Models 5e8. Non-ﬁnancial disclosure and board independence are insigniﬁcant, and thus do not mediate political
ties in credit markets. Therefore, we did not ﬁnd support for H4 and H5. Only ﬁnancial reporting quality has a signiﬁcant
association with interest rates (Model 5: b ¼ 0.006, p < 0.01). However, caution must be exercised in the interpretation of
this ﬁnding. For mediation to exist, “the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable must be less… when
the mediating variable is controlled (Baron and Kenny, 1986: 1177). Therefore, the size and/or signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcient
for political ties should be lower in Model 5 where it is estimated together with ﬁnancial reporting quality. Our results do not
show a change in the coefﬁcient/signiﬁcance of political ties between Model 1 and Model 5, and hence do not provide strong
support for mediation.
To further probe and check the robustness of the results, we conducted Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) without the
controls. Consistent with the regression results, SEM shows that political ties are negatively related to ﬁnancial reporting
quality (b ¼ 0.086, p < 0.05), disclosure of non-ﬁnancial information (b ¼ 0.170, p < 0.01) and board independence
(b ¼ 0.010, p < 0.05). Of the three mediators, only ﬁnancial reporting quality has a signiﬁcant effect on the cost of debt
(b ¼ 0.007, p < 0.01) but because direct effect of political ties is also signiﬁcant (b ¼ 0.007, p < 0.01), the results suggest the
presence of partial mediation. Though the indirect effect - which measures the amount of mediation - is weakly signiﬁcant
(b ¼ 0.001, p < 0.1), it lies exactly on the lower bound of the 95% bias-corrected conﬁdence interval (i.e. 0.001e0.003). This
evidence conﬁrms why the coefﬁcient for political ties did not change between Models 1 and 5 (Table 4). Taking the results
together, we did not ﬁnd support for mediation and for H3.Table 4
Mediation results.
Dependent variable
Interest rate
(Model 1)
Financial rep
quality
(Model 2)
Non-ﬁnancial
disclosure
(Model 3)
Board
independence
(Model 4)
Interest rate
(Model 5)
Interest rate
(Model 6)
Interest rate
(Model 7)
Interest rate
(Model 8)
Independent variable
Managerial political ties 0.008*** 0.096** 0.169*** 0.009** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007***
Mediator variables
Financial reporting quality 0.006*** 0.005**
Non-ﬁnancial disclosure 0.003 0.002
Board independence 0.023 0.022
Control variables
Institutional holding 0.007*** 0.093 0.007 0.022*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006***
Firm age 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Firm size 0.001 0.138 0.034 0.024 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
Ownership 0.016*** 0.082 0.108 0.020 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.016***
Value of collateral 0.004** 0.004 0.009 0.002 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004**
Credit relationships 0.007*** 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007***
Model summary
F value 19.64*** 1.18 8.51*** 3.69*** 18.70*** 17.19*** 17.36*** 15.01***
Adjusted R2 0.44 0.01 0.23 0.10 0.46 0.44 0.44 0.46
Note: N¼ 179; ***Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 1% level (2-tailed); **Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 5% level (2-tailed); *Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 10%
level (2-tailed). Results shown in three decimal places in order not to suppress effects.Discussion and conclusion
This study has explored a nascent topic and has shed light on the contested effect and the under-explored mechanisms of
political ties (Rajwani and Liedong, 2015). The ﬁndings reveal a positive relationship between political ties and cost of debt,
which becomesmore pronounced when connected ﬁrms borrow from privately-owned banks andweaker when they borrow
from government-owned banks. Essentially, politically connected ﬁrms are perceived to be risky (Bliss and Gul, 2012) and
fraught with moral hazard problems (Chaney et al., 2011), but due to the nature of the agency relationship existing between
politicians and State enterprises, government-owned banks tend overlook these problems in their credit assessments.
The ﬁndings also reveal a negative relationship between political ties and the governance variables, namely ﬁnancial
reporting quality, non-ﬁnancial disclosure and board independence. These results are consistent with prior studies in two
ways. First, concerns have been documented about the proneness of politically connected ﬁrms to ﬁnancial misbehaviour
(Guedhami et al., 2014; Gul, 2006). These ﬁrms are more likely to manipulate their accounts in order to conceal politically
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they receive from politicians. Their malpractices are rarely detected and legal systems are inﬂuenced to overlook related
agency problems (Correia, 2014; Sun et al., 2016). Second, evidence shows that the quality of accounting information dis-
closed by connected ﬁrms is lower when compared to that of non-connected ﬁrms (Chaney et al., 2011).
Contrary to our prediction, ﬁnancial reporting quality, disclosure of non-ﬁnancial information and board independence do
not mediate the relationship between political ties and the cost of debt. Cognizant of the institutional and governance
challenges in Ghana, it is perhaps still early for banks to factor ﬁnancial and non-mandatory information into their loan
pricing decisions, especially for connected ﬁrms which often enjoy political and institutional protection (Park and Luo, 2001;
Xin and Pearce, 1996). To the extent that connected ﬁrms are protected by the very agencies responsible for enforcing
ﬁnancial and regulatory compliance (Chaney et al., 2011), it is possible that banks' pricing of loans to these ﬁrms is not
inﬂuenced by the quality of ﬁnancial reporting. Moreover, low internet penetration in Africa and lack of technological re-
sources make it difﬁcult for ﬁrms to use online platforms to disclose non-ﬁnancial information. Hence, even though con-
nected ﬁrms do not disclose this information, banks rarely take it into account when setting interest rates. Arguably, most
ﬁrms in Africa could be excluded from credit if disclosure of non-ﬁnancial information is a stringent yardstick for credit-
worthiness. Similarly, in Ghana where most of the ﬁrms are privately held and board culture is generally poor (Abor and
Biekpe, 2007), it is not surprising that board independence is not uniquely considered by banks when pricing loans to
connected ﬁrms.
Altogether, the results demonstrate that in emerging countries, the lack of strong institutions to support and enforce good
corporate governance (Young et al., 2008) coupled with weak checks and balances in political systems allow politically
connected ﬁrms to develop poor governance cultures to conceal rent appropriation and evade stakeholder scrutiny. Even
though connected ﬁrms are charged high interest rates, their poor governance does not seem tomediate their performance in
credit markets. In other words, connected ﬁrms are able to get awaywith their poor governance in credit markets where they
should be penalized. Consequently, it is plausible to argue that moral hazard in connected ﬁrms is reinforced by the failure of
banks and other ﬁnancial institutions to penalize these ﬁrms for their illegal and unethical behaviour.
This study contributes to CPA literature in signiﬁcantways. First, it extends CPA research to credit markets in an empirically
under-researched context. The effect of political ties on cost of debt has not received adequate attention, despite the
importance of loan ﬁnance for ﬁrms (Adomako et al., 2016; Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006). Moreover, ﬁndings from the few
studies that have examined this topic are mixed and inconclusive. While there is a consensus that political connections
enhance access to ﬁnance in developed and emerging markets alike (e.g. Claessens et al., 2008; Faccio, 2010; Houston et al.,
2014; Khwaja and Mian, 2005), there is no agreement about the effect of these connections on loan prices. For example,
whereas research in the developed country context suggests that political connections lead to lower costs of debt (Houston
et al., 2014; Infante and Piazza, 2014), some studies in emerging countries ﬁnd a negative effect of political ties on the cost of
debt (e.g. Bliss and Gul, 2012).
According to Houston et al. (2014), connected ﬁrms receive preferential treatment in credit markets through the borrower
channel. In other words, bankers are aware of the inﬂuence of political connections on proﬁtability, performance (Goldman
et al., 2009; Hillman, 2005) and policy risk exposure (Bradley et al., 2016), and hence hold positive perceptions about the
creditworthiness of connected ﬁrms. They argue that the borrower channel is more relevant in developed markets where
strong institutions make it difﬁcult for politicians to direct bank lending. We argue that, indeed, the borrower channelmay be
limited to developed contexts. While bankers in emerging countries may know that politically connected ﬁrms have greater
access to scarce resources and business opportunities, they are also fully aware of the potential risks and hazards inherent in
these ﬁrms (Bliss and Gul, 2012). As such, they charge higher interest rates to compensate for the underlying riskiness caused
by the connected ﬁrms' moral hazard which is less likely to be checked by weak institutions in emerging countries.
Moreover, the enforcement of creditor rights in emerging countries is weak (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013). Generally, in
countries where there is weak enforcement of creditor rights, banks charge high loan rates (Bae and Goyal, 2009). Banks may
even charge higher rates due to the negligible “power” they have to enforce loan obligations against connected ﬁrms which
enjoy high political support. High interest charges will compensate banks for their limited ability to recover loans in events of
default. The problem of weak creditor rights is more serious for privately-owned banks, mainly as these banks usually do not
have as much political clout as government-owned banks; hence their high interest charges reﬂect their curtailed loan re-
covery power. This study therefore sheds more light on the conditional worth of political ties in emerging credit markets.
Second, this study affords rich insights into the dynamic value of political ties in general, and the dark side of political
activity in particular (Sun et al., 2016). It lends support to the view that political ties do not only reduce the strategic agility of
ﬁrms (Sun et al., 2010), but they are also costly and inimical to ﬁrm performance (Hadani and Schuler, 2013; Park and Luo,
2001; Okhmatovskiy, 2010). In emerging countries especially, regime changes can turn previously valuable political ties
into liabilities (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Siegel, 2007; Sun et al., 2012) and this can have ripple effects on other
organizational outcomes, such as the cost of debt. In Africa, the acrimony and vindictiveness of politics causes new regimes to
persecute and discriminate against ﬁrms that were connected to erstwhile regimes, mainly to discredit previous political
elites and also to gain popular legitimacy (Henisz and Zelner, 2003). Essentially, having “wrong friends at the wrong time”
reduces shareholder value. Our study therefore suggests that the dynamism of political embeddedness results in tempo-
rariness of political capital, hence the reasonwhy the borrower channel (Houston et al., 2014) may not be relevant in emerging
countries. Further, this study shows the darker side of political ties. It joins the few studies that have addressed the inﬂuence
of political connections on corporate governance and agency relationships (e.g. Aggarwal et al., 2012; Chaney et al., 2011;
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leads to poor corporate governance.
Third, this study attempts to enhance our understanding of how political ties affect cost of debt. One of the notable
shortcomings in CPA literature is the limited treatise of mediatingmechanisms (Guo et al., 2014). In the past, most researchers
were mainly interested in answering the “what” questions but not the “how” questions (Liedong et al., 2015). Our ﬁndings
show that even though political ties lead to poor governance, poor governance does not seem tomediate the impact of ties on
the cost of debt. This phenomenon further reinforces and accentuates the moral hazard problem, and portrays the factors
underlying the poor quality of ﬁnancial information disclosed by connected ﬁrms (Chaney et al., 2011). In sum, this study's
focus on the mediation provides a better understanding of the dynamics and implications of governance in connected ﬁrms.
The insightful ﬁndings of this study have practical implications. They suggest that politically connected ﬁrms in emerging
countries are poorly governed. Managers of these ﬁrms should therefore strengthen corporate governance in order to quell
the negative views of ﬁnancial misconduct and corruption that are often associated with deep political embeddedness in
weak institutional environments. Additionally, regulators will have to increase the monitoring and scrutiny of corporate
governance in politically connected ﬁrms, mainly as these ﬁrms are more likely to indulge in inappropriate behaviour.
Limitations, future research and conclusion
Beside the contributions, this study has limitations. First, it uses cross-sectional data and is therefore prone to endogeneity
problems. We addressed some of the sources of endogeneity such as autocorrelation of error terms. We also designed the
survey to collect responses within a three-year frame (Mesquita and Lazzarini, 2008; White et al., 2015), hence we allowed
adequate time for the effect of political ties on the cost of debt to be observed. Further, we tried to lag the dependent variable
by collecting data from same ﬁrms in 2015. Though we experienced sample attrition (which made the data unusable for
multivariate analyses), there were no signiﬁcant differences between the data from the two phases, which suggests that our
analyses do not suffer from reverse causality. However, readers should be cautious when interpreting the ﬁndings, since other
sources of endogeneity such as measurement errors and omitted variables could still inﬂuence the results. We recommend
future research to use longitudinal designs and secondary data where possible.
Second, the scope of this study is limited to three governance mediators. We therefore encourage future research to
continue to explore the role of agency in the cost of debt, especially governance indicators such as board audit committees,
shareholder rights, and CEO duality within the context of Africa in general and Ghana in particular. Importantly, since none of
the mediators of this study is signiﬁcant, it would be insightful to investigate the other mechanisms inﬂuencing banks'
lending decisions.
Third, we acknowledge that there is a dark side of political activity (Doh et al., 2012). For instance, prior research has noted
that politically connected ﬁrms obtain favours from banks through threats and coercion from politicians (Khwaja and Mian,
2005). We encourage studies to build on this current study and investigate whether such dark agency mechanisms are at play
when connected ﬁrms borrow from banks. We contend that this line of research will be best suited to emerging countries
where weak institutions make it easier for governments to use their unchecked power to inﬂuence bank lending (Houston
et al., 2014). Political interference could hamper bank due diligence, leading to punitive interest charges. We therefore
believe future research could contribute to CPA literature and agency theory by exploring mediating mechanisms from the
over-looked supply-side of credit markets e the bankers.
In conclusion, this study contributes to a deeper understanding of the mediating mechanisms through which political ties
affect outcomes in credit markets. The ﬁndings and conclusions are not only important for CPA researchers, but they are also
useful to practitioners and regulators, especially in Ghana and other emerging countries.
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